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Almost a quarter of the young people in the EU are unemployed. And 
once again it is the crisis-ridden states that have been hit hardest. But 
in other countries such as France, Sweden, and Luxembourg, younger 
members of the workforce, far more than their older counterparts, are 
also finding it difficult to get a job. Freedom of movement within the EU 
could help to provide them with new opportunities. All that is needed 
is the right kind of support.
The sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone 
has had dramatic consequences for Euro-
pean labour markets. In April 2012, almost 
25 million people in the EU were out of work 
– a historic high. Whereas unemployment 
in Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands ranged from just 3.9% to 5.4%, 
in Greece and Spain joblessness climbed to 
almost 25%.
The increase in youth unemployment has 
been especially disastrous. As of 2012, 35% of 
people under the age of 25 in Italy and Portu-
gal were out of work, and in Spain and Greece 
this was true of 50% of their peers. Thus 5.5   
million young people (22.6%) between the 
I
ages of 14 and 25 are unemployed. One of the 
reasons why unemployment in the southern 
eurozone countries is on the increase is that 
since the euro’s introduction in 2002 they 
have not managed to boost their productivity.
In the past, countries that ran into economic 
difficulties were able to devalue their curren-
cies if low productivity was adversely affect-
ing their competitiveness. A flexible exchange 
rate was an important tool which could be 
used to compensate for an economy’s out-
moded manufacturing technology, and thus 
to maintain its international competitiveness. 
In theory, the mechanism works as follows: 
A country with low productivity levels deval-
ues its currency with the help of a flexible 
exchange rate. This reduces its costs, and s
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If countries with divergent productivity growth 
rates decide to establish a currency union, they 
should meet at least one of the following criteria. 
They should be in a position to lower their wage 
levels and thus be able to reduce their manufac-
turing costs in ways that are not dependent on 
technological progress. Or they should have a 
mobile workforce that is prepared to go where 
the jobs are. However, in the eurozone these 
criteria for a viable monetary union exist only 
to a limited extent. Thus in his essay “Die Krise 
im Euro-Raum: Auslöser, Antworten, Ausblick” 
(The Eurozone Crisis: Reasons, Answers, and 
the Future), Henrik Enderlein, professor at the 
Hertie School of Governance, comes to a sober-
ing conclusion: “On paper Europe may have cre-
ated an internal market, but we are a long way 
away from a totally integrated economic area.”
II
Mobility Instead of 
Unemployment
Every economy has to find ways of dealing 
with the economic imbalances of its constitu-
ent regions. The eurozone is no exception. It 
seems likely that there will continue to be con-
siderable differences in productivity within 
the eurozone and that they will continue to 
have a negative effect on the competitiveness 
of certain member states. In order to prevent 
a rise in unemployment in these countries, it 
would make sense to think about how it can 
be made easier for the jobless to go to where 
the jobs are. In an ideal situation, people will 
move from weak economies to internationally 
competitive countries, thereby reducing un-
employment in their home countries. 
To a certain extent, this is already happen-
ing.  With regard to migration to Germany in 
2011, the Federal Statistical Office stated: “The 
migration of foreigners increased, especially 
from the EU area (by 138.000, or 34%). And 
there was a noticeable increase in immigration 
from EU countries that have been badly hit by 
the financial and debt crisis.  Ninety percent 
more immigrants than in 2010 came from 
Greece (11.000 people) and 52% from Spain 
cushions the negative impact of declining 
international competitiveness. But since the 
introduction of a common currency, this is 
no longer possible. The absence of a national 
currency and at the same time low productiv-
ity growth have led to declining exports and 
rising imports. The declining demand for (ex-
pensive) domestic products is both the rea-
son for and the result of these developments. 
And the accelerated decline in manufacturing 
has led to a rise in joblessness.
Unemployment in the EU
Youth Unemployment Trends in 2007 and 2011
Source: Eurostat, 2012 © Bertelsmann Stiftung
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(7.000 people).“ However, in absolute terms 
the data show that workforce migration is still 
much too small to make a substantial contri-
bution to solving the labour market problems 
of the weak economies. Although freedom of 
movement enshrined in EU legislation has re-
moved the legal barriers to migration within 
the EU (with the exception of Romania and 
Bulgaria), in practice the theoretically obvious 
idea of underpinning the viability of the mon-
etary union with the help of workforce migra-
tion runs up against a number of obstacles and 
anxieties. In addition to linguistic and cultural 
barriers, these include fears that the migrants 
will disadvantage the native workforce.
III
A Blessing or a Curse?
It is reflexively assumed that an influx of 
workers could have a negative impact on the 
domestic labour force: For example, through 
a greater labour supply and thus downward 
pressure on wages, or through heightened 
competition among the workers. 
However, this short-term view ignores a num-
ber of dynamic developments that can soften 
and perhaps redress the negative impact of 
lower wages and unemployment on the native 
workforce:
•	 First, one should not forget that demand 
for goods and services is generated by an in-
crease in the number of people gainfully em-
ployed. On the one hand, an overall increase 
in employment leads to an increase in dispos-
able income, and this translates into a rise in 
consumer expenditure. On the other hand, 
an increase in employment will probably 
lead to an upsurge in investment demand. 
Higher levels of consumer and investment 
demand lead to an increase in labour de-
mand, which will also benefit native workers; 
•	 Second, declining wages have the ef-
fect of reducing manufacturing costs in the 
immigration region. This will enhance in-
ternational competitiveness, causing ex-
ports to increase. The net result is that re-
cruitment at export-oriented companies 
goes up, and this in turn leads to across-
the-board growth and rising employment; 
•	 Third, surveys have shown that migrant 
workers frequently save more and are more 
willing to take risks than the domestic popu-
lation. As sociologist Michael Bommes points 
out in “Migration und Veränderung der Ge-
sellschaft” (Migration and Societal Change), 
migrants have a positive effect on overall sav-
ings,  investment, and above all on the number 
of start-ups. All of these factors help to initiate 
a process of economic growth that also ben-
efits the citizens of the immigration region; 
•	 Fourth, as a result of wage bargaining or 
legal provisions it tends to be difficult to re-
duce wages. This means that wages often do 
not decline even if immigration increases the 
size of the workforce. Furthermore, numerous 
studies show that on the labour market new mi-
grants tend to compete with earlier migrants 
more than with the domestic workforce. Her-
bert Brücker comes to the following conclusion 
in “Neue Erkenntnisse zu den Arbeitsmark-
twirkungen internationaler Migration” (New 
Immigration to Germany 
according to Origin Country, 
2011
Source: Federal Office of Statistics, 2012 © Bertelsmann Stiftung
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IV
Advantage or Disadvantage?
The exodus of workers from an economy suffer-
ing from high unemployment takes some of the 
pressure off local labour market and welfare 
budgets, which would otherwise have to make 
transfer payments. For this reason, migration 
has a generally positive impact on the southern 
European states currently battling very high 
unemployment.
However, in addition to the positive effects men-
tioned above, an exodus of workers can also 
have disadvantages. Above all, there is a dan-
ger of a “brain drain,” that is, the loss of highly 
qualified workers. Studies of migration pat-
terns have shown that highly qualified young 
people are particularly willing to migrate. For 
the region they leave this means a deterioration 
in productivity. That is why brain drain has a 
negative influence on growth and development 
prospects. If the region from which they come 
is an economy with a below-average level of de-
velopment – as is currently the case with the 
southern eurozone states – brain drain simply 
exacerbates the growth and welfare disparities 
between the regions. In general, migrants leave 
their countries of origin with their savings. This 
represents a loss of capital for those economies. 
A lack of capital is a primary growth-retarding 
factor, especially in less developed economies. 
Insights into the Labour Market Effects of In-
ternational Migration): “The majority of stud-
ies suggest that the native population comes 
out on top in almost all the various qualifica-
tion groups, whereas to an important extent 
the people who lose out in this situation are 
foreigners who already live in the country;” 
•	 Finally, it is quite conceivable that there 
is a shortage of labour in the immigration 
region. In this case migrant workers will not 
lead to declining wages, and native workers 
will not be put out of work. In fact, the migrant 
workers simply fill the supply and demand 
gap on the labour market and raise the over-
all level of employment without generating a 
distributional conflict with domestic workers.
When these dynamic effects are taken into ac-
count, it may well be that the arrival of mi-
grant workers can positively impact wages 
and employment opportunities for the domes-
tic workforce. In “Arbeitsmarkt und Migra-
tion” (Labour Market and Migration), a survey 
of studies devoted to the impact of migration 
on wage levels and employment opportuni-
ties, Max Steinhardt of the Hamburgisches 
Weltwirtschaftsinstitut concludes: “The vari-
ous different empirical methodologies all indi-
cate that migration has no more than a minor 
effect on wages and employment opportuni-
ties within a certain country.”  
Labour Migration
Migration in and out of Eurozone Countries with High Unemployment to Germany, 2007 to 2011
Source: Federal Ofﬁce of Statistics, 2012 © Bertelsmann Stiftung
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When it comes to the availability of capital, the 
emigration of highly qualified workers acts as 
a brake on the development of the southern eu-
rozone states.
However, it is possible to single out a number 
of things that actually counteract these nega-
tive trends. Thus brain drain and the loss of 
capital can be overcome and reversed by other 
developments:
•	 First, it needs to be remembered that not all 
emigrants leave their country of origin forever. 
Many of them return home after a temporary pe-
riod abroad, and raise the level of the local human 
capital on account of the skills acquired abroad; 
•	 When there is a high level of unemploy-
ment, and in particular high youth unemploy-
ment, there is little incentive for young people 
to invest time and money in their education. 
However, in countries with high unemployment 
rates the prospect of earning higher wages 
abroad can be an incentive to pursue education. 
Since not all of those who decide to improve 
their educational qualifications will actually go 
abroad, this will raise the educational level in 
the country as a whole. In other words, “brain 
gain” may well replace “brain drain.” This is 
not merely a theoretical concept. In “Migration: 
Entwicklungsmotor statt Entwicklungsbremse” 
(Migration: An Engine of and not a Brake on 
Development) Marcus Böhme, Toman Omar 
Mahmoud, and Rainer Thiele state: “Empirical 
studies have shown that brain gain really does 
exist, and that in some countries it can more 
than offset the emigration of skilled workers;”   
•	 Migrants can make up for the loss of capi-
tal that is part and parcel of the process of 
emigration. This happens when people who 
have gone abroad send part of their income 
to family members in their home country. Ac-
cording to the World Bank, in 2010 these re-
mittances amounted to US$325 billion globally. 
This is about three times the size of official 
development assistance. In 2011 remittances 
are expected to total US$351 billion. It is re-
markable that between 1990 and 2010 the 
number of migrants increased by only 40 
percent in global terms, whereas within this 
period the volume of remittances increased 
tenfold. Even if these figures refer primar-
ily to migrants from developing countries, it 
would not be wrong to assume that the data 
are similar in the case of European migration. 
V
An Opportunity for Everyone
When one takes into account the medium-term 
and long-term effects, migration is clearly an 
opportunity for all of the countries involved. In 
the immigration regions, migration can trigger 
growth and overcome labour shortages; it does 
not have to lead to declining wages and unem-
ployment among the native workforce. And in 
out-migration regions, migration can contribute 
to lowering unemployment. It does not have to 
lead to brain drain and a loss of capital.
Against the backdrop of the economic diversity 
of the eurozone and the associated challenges 
– high unemployment in weak economies and 
a nascent dearth of labour in the booming re-
gions – migrant workers who are willing to 
move between the different eurozone countries   
can contribute to overcoming the difficulties 
facing labour markets. In the economically 
weaker regions of the eurozone, an exodus of 
migrant workers could offset the rise in the 
number of people who are out of work (which 
has a negative impact on government finances 
since measures designed to combat unemploy-
ment lead to rising expenditure). This in turn 
would obviate the need for greater public in-
debtedness and contribute to the stabilization 
of public finances within the eurozone.
VI
Creating Greater Mobility
The EU is committed to the free movement of 
people. Thus Article 15 of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights states: “Every citizen of the 
Union has the freedom to seek employment, to 
work, to exercise the right of establishment and 
to provide services in any Member State.” The s
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•	 In order to increase the level of immigration 
in the economic strong regions of the eurozone 
it will be necessary to adopt a pro-active way 
of attracting qualified and highly qualified peo-
ple from the weaker eurozone states. This will 
include the establishment of additional service 
and information centres which can provide po-
tential migrants in the weaker regions with in-
formation about work opportunities and the ad-
ministrative framework in the stronger regions; 
•	 After people have moved to an economic 
strong eurozone country they must be integrat-
ed into its society. They must have the same so-
cial participation rights as everyone else. Lin-
guistic skills are one of the main preconditions 
for this. Thus it is essential to provide support for 
those learning and teaching foreign languages; 
•	 And last but not least, the successful inte-
gration of migrants presupposes that an effort 
has been made to calm fears  about the negative 
economic consequences of large numbers of 
immigrants. The main anxiety will probably be 
the fear that migrant workers will exacerbate 
low wages and joblessness, even if  these fears 
are unfounded. Providing better information for 
the domestic population can reduce the anxiety 
caused by large-scale immigration and make it 
easier to integrate immigrants.
Even if the current sovereign debt problems in 
the eurozone cannot be overcome merely by 
encouraging workforce migration, it can make 
a valuable contribution to resolving the crisis. 
Moreover, a reduction in unemployment in the 
crisis-ridden countries is absolutely essential, 
not only because it is imperative to improve the 
state of public finances, but also in order to pre-
vent the outbreak of social and political unrest.
freedom to look for a job throughout the whole 
of the EU is one of the fundamental freedoms of 
the single market. Nevertheless, regional work-
force mobility within the EU is lower than in 
the “US currency area.” If we wish to reduce 
the pressure on labour markets in the economi-
cally weak eurozone states by improving the 
mobility of the workforce, we will have to give 
more support to migration than in the past.
The following measures can help to increase 
the level of intra-EU migration:
•	 Migrant workers are primarily motivated 
by attractive working and living conditions, ca-
reer prospects,  educational and work opportu-
nities for family members,  taxes and other lev-
ies and contributions, and immigration-friendly 
administrative processes, as well as by soft fac-
tors such as tolerance, respect for diversity, and 
the freedom to shape one’s own destiny. An at-
tractive “welcoming culture” in the immigration 
regions is considered of especial importance. 
Support needs to be given to reuniting families 
so that partners and children can improve their 
vocational prospects. In formal terms this is 
not a problem within the EU (with the excep-
tion of Romania and Bulgaria), but in practice 
implementation continues to be rather difficult; 
•	 In order to enable people looking for work 
to take up employment in other EU countries, 
they need to have access to information about 
local labour markets. In this area, greater co-
operation between European employment agen-
cies is just as important as the development of 
multilingual databases containing details of em-
ployment opportunities. This is already the case 
with the job mobility portal EURES. Working in 
a country that is not one’s own should also be 
facilitated by the speedy, non-bureaucratic rec-
ognition of home-country qualifications and di-
plomas, and above all in the case of EU citizens: 
by a citizen-friendly implementation of the EU 
Directive on the Recognition of Professional 
Qualifications.  It would also be helpful if there 
were a better, less complicated way of transfer-
ring social insurance claims, e.g. an entitle-
ment to unemployment benefit for people who 
are abroad in order to look for work (see the 
regulation on EU Social Security Coordination); s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
#
 
2
0
1
2
 
/
 
0
4
 
 
 
C
a
n
 
M
o
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
O
f
f
s
e
t
 
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
?
7
Further Reading:
Bertelsmann Stiftung: Integration und Vielfalt neu denken und gestalten – Positionspapier der Bertelsmann 
Stiftung zum gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt in Deutschland, Gütersloh o.J.
Böhme, Marcus, Toman Omar Mahmoud and Rainer Thiele: Migration: Entwicklungsmotor statt Entwick-
lungsbremse, IfW Fokus 111 from 19.12.2011, Kiel 2011.
Bommes, Michael: Migration und die Veränderung der Gesellschaft, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte Nr. 35-
36/2008, p. 20-25.
Brücker, Herbert: Neue Erkenntnisse zu den Arbeitsmarktwirkungen internationaler Migration – Ein kritischer 
Überblick über vorliegende Befunde, in: WSI Mitteilungen 10/2010, p. 499-507.
Enderlein, Henrik: Die Krise im Euro-Raum: Auslöser, Antworten, Ausblick, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 
43/2010, p. 7-12.
Petersen, Thieß: Ökonomische Theorie der Migration, in: Das Wirtschaftsstudium (WISU), 37. Jg., 2008,  
p. 976-980.
Federal Office of Statistics: Hohe Zuwanderung nach Deutschland im Jahr 2011, Press Release Nr. 171 
from 16.05.2012, Wiesbaden 2012.
Steinhardt, Max: Arbeitsmarkt und Migration – eine empirische Analyse der Lohn- und Beschäftigungsef-
fekte der Zuwanderung für Deutschland, HWWI Research Paper 3-4 des HWWI-Kompetenzbereichs Migration, 
Hamburg 2006.
World Bank: Migration and Development Brief No. 17: Outlook for Remittance Flows 2012-14, Washington DC 2011.
European Commission: "Youth Opportunities Initiative“
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1006&langId=ens
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
#
 
2
0
1
2
 
/
 
0
4
 
 
 
C
a
n
 
M
o
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
O
f
f
s
e
t
 
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
?
8
Responsible:
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl Bertelsmann Straße 256
D-33311 Gütersloh
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Isabell Hoffmann
isabell.hoffmann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Tel.  +49 5241 81 81313
Joachim Fritz-Vannahme
joachim.vannahme@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Tel.  +49 5241 81 81421
ISSN 1865-7443
Latest editions:
spotlight europe # 2012/03
Long live the United States of Europe
Joachim Fritz-Vannahme
spotlight europe # 2012/02
Stability has a Price
Dr. Thieß Petersen
spotlight europe # 2012/01
The New EU.
The Consequences of the Polish EU Presidency
Cornelius Ochmann
All "spotlight europe" editions can be  
downloaded from:  
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/spotlight